In this paper we describe some of our progress towards an operational implementation of a modern programming logic. The logic is inspired by the variable type systems of Feferman, and is designed for reasoning about imperative functional programs. The logic goes well beyond traditional programming logics, such as Hoare's logic and Dynamic logic in its expressibility, yet is less problematic to encode into higher order logics. The main focus of the paper is too present an axiomatization of the base first order theory.
Introduction
VTLoE [34, 23, 35, 37, 24] is a logic for reasoning about imperative functional programs, inspired by the variable type systems of Feferman. These systems are two sorted theories of operations and classes initially developed for the formalization of constructive mathematics [12, 13] and later applied to the study of purely functional languages [14, 15] . VTLoE builds upon recent advances in the semantics of languages with effects [16, 19, 28, 32, 33] and goes well beyond traditional programming logics, such as Hoare's logic [7] and Dynamic logic [22] by treating a richer language and expressing more properties. It is close in spirit to Specification Logic [49] and to Evaluation Logic [44] .
The underlying programming language of VTLoE, is the set of variables that can actually be trapped in the process of filling the holes in .
Abbreviations
In order to make programs easier to read, we introduce some abbreviations. This version of the fixed-point combinator is essentially identical to the one suggested by Landin [27] . [32] ). Note that this example is typable in the simply typed lambda calculus (for provably non-empty types (cf. [24] )). Thus adding operations for manipulating references to the simply typed lambda calculus causes the failure of strong normalization as well as many other of its nice mathematical properties.
Integer Streams
From an abstract point of view, a stream is simply a (possibly infinite) sequence of data [2] . In the ¡ ¢ ¥ ¤ -calculus we can represent streams simply as functional objects. The sequence corresponding to a ¡ ¢ ¥ ¤ -stream is the values reurned by repeated application of the object to a fixed (and hopefully irrelevant argument). The simplest example of a non-trivial
applied to an integer ¢ creates a stream of integers beginning with that integer. The so-created stream when queried (applied to any value) returns the next integer in the stream.
The Sieve of Eratosthenes
A somewhat more interesting example of a stream is the sieve of Eratosthenes [2] . We begin with the functional 
Semantics of Terms
The operational semantics of expressions is given by a reduction relation B on a syntactic representation of the state of an abstract machine, referred to as computation descriptions. A state has three components: the current instruction, the current continuation, and the current state of memory. Their syntactic counterparts are redexes, reduction contexts, and memory contexts respectively. Redexes describe the primitive computation steps. A primitive step is either a reduction or the application of a primitive operation to a sequence of value expressions. The set of redexes,
Reduction contexts identify the subexpression of an expression that is to be evaluated next, they correspond to the standard reduction strategy (left-first, call-by-value) of [46] and were first introduced in [ . Some simple consequences of the computation rules are that reduction is functional modulo alpha conversion, memory contexts may be pulled out of reduction contexts, and computation is uniform in free variables, unreferenced memory and reduction contexts.
Lemma (cr):
In (cr.i) ! is the usual notion of alpha equivalence. It makes explicit the fact that arbitrary choice in cell allocation is the same phenomenon as arbitrary choice of names of bound variables.
Operational Equivalence of Terms
In this section we define the operational equivalence relation and study its general properties. Operational equivalence formalizes the notion of equivalence as black-boxes. Treating programs as black boxes requires only observing what effects and values they produce, and not how they produce them. Our definition extends the extensional equivalence relations defined by [40] and [46] to computation over memory structures. As shown by [3, 4, 9, 11, 25, 28, 32, 26, 38, 42, 45, 50, 51] operational equivalence and approximation can be characterized in various ways. 
Definition
The operational equivalence is not trivial since the inclusion of branching implies that and H are not equivalent. By definition operational equivalence is a congruence relation on expressions:
However it is not necessarily the case that substitution instances of equivalent expressions are equivalent even if the instantiating expressions always returns a value. As a counter-example we have . The reason underlying this is that in the case of programs with effects, returning a value is not an appropriate characterization of definedness. In particular returning a value is not the same as being operationally equivalent to a value. This is in contrast to the purely functional case and is due to the presence of effects. For example, each of the following expressions always returns a value 
for any of the above three expressions. The first has an allocation effect. The second has a write effect. The third has a read effect.
In general it is very difficult to establish the operational equivalence of expressions. Thus it is desirable to have a simpler characterization of S ! , one that limits the class of contexts (or observations) that must be considered. The main context lemma in this case is the following
3 The Syntax and Semantics of Formulas
Syntax
The first order fragment of our logic is a minor generalization of classical first order logic. The atomic formulas assert the equivaluedness and operational equivalence of expressions. In addition to the usual first-order formula constructions, we add a -assertion: if is a formula, a variable, and { an expression then
is a formula.
Definition (¡ ):
For typographical convenience we will let ¤ range over the class of contexts. Thus ¤ denotes a generic member of
Semantics
The meaning of formulas is given by a Tarskian satisfaction relation
.
for © y , and 6 © ¢ § 9 !
. Then we define the satisfaction relation
by induction on the structure of :
As is usual in logic we define the subsidary notions of validity and logical consequence as follows:
Examples, Counterexamples and Caveats
Negation is definable, Note that there are at least two notions of definedness that we can express. We let
. A stronger notion of definedness is that of being equivalent (either via S or via S ! ) to a value. These two notions will be important later. We use the symbol $ to denote either of the binary relations in our logic, S ! and S . It is important to note that, unlike equality in first order logic, neither of these binary relations (
is falsifiable (even when no trapping occurs). For example
is obviously not valid. Similarly false is the related principle that
. For example
is clearly not valid. Also along these lines is the observation that while
is valid, its converse is false. Since
is not.
Violation of Privacy
Rather than give the impression that everything is rosy, we point out the following problem raised in [37] . One seemingly desirable logical principle for contextual reasoning is to be able to replace the { by any operationally equivalent expression without changing the semantics of the contextual assertion
. In other words the following principle seems desirable:
However, there are several ways in which this can fail in this logic. For example g ¦ may produce some garbage that H © does not, and this garbage may be detectable via . For example letting
provides a counterexample. Another more troublesome counterexample relies on the fact that ¦ and © may be equivalent due to the privacy of certain cells, however their privacy is not respected by the contextual assertion. A simple example of this is:
A simple induction on the length of computations (similar to those found in [32] ) establishes that ¦ and © are operationally equivalent, and hence ¦ S ! © is valid. The essential observation is that the cell q is local to the value/object returned by © and thus invisible and its contents unalterable outside this scope. However it is not the case that
However all is not lost, we do have that the weaker principle
is valid.
Extending the Syntax of Contextual Assertions
For simplicity we have minimalized the syntax of contextual assertions to simple statements. In earlier treatments [24] we dealt with a much wider class of contexts, called univalent contexts, (U-contexts). They are the largest natural class of contexts whose symbolic evaluation is unproblematic. The key restriction is that we forbid the hole to appear in the scope of a (non-) lambda, thus preventing the proliferation of holes. The class of U-contexts, ¢ , is defined as follows.
Definition (
The semantics is a simple generalization of the one presented here, and the curious are refered to [24] for details. The main reason for restricting our attention to contexts, apart from the simplicity in presentation, is that those left out may be considered abbreviations:
provided are fresh.
(2)
That these abbreviations are in fact sound derive from theorem (ca.iii) in [24] which states that (in this generalized semantics):
Proof Theory
Since contextual assertions are akin to modalities, we give a Hilbert style presentation. In the long run a natural deduction style system in the style of Prawitz [47] may be more desirable.
Definition ( ):
The consequence relation,
, is the smallest relation on ¡ that is closed under the rules given below.
The rules are partitioned into several groups. Each group of rules is given a label, for future reference, and members of the group are numbered. For example (E.i) refers to the first rule in the group of equivalence and evaluation rules (the second group below). A rule has a (possibly empty) set of premisses and a conclusion. In the case that the set of premisses is non-empty the rule is displayed with a horizontal bar separating the premisses from the conclusion.
Variable Convention:
We adopt Barendregt's convention [8] that in any particular mathematical situation the bound and free variables in expressions are distinct. However we do (and must) allow free variables of expressions to coincide with bound (trappable) variables in contexts.
So for example we assume in: (E.vi) that not free in
; and in (S.i) that i r t q . On the other hand in in (¦ § .i) we must explicitly state that the variable is distinct from the variables and q . This convention makes the statement of (Q.i) somewhat cumbersome.
Most axioms hold true for both equivaluedness, S , and operational equivalence,
S !
, If this is the case, then rather than write out the principle twice, we use the symbol $ to range over these two equivalence relations. One important reason for introducing S is that important principles fails for S ! . In particular (C.iii) below fails as indicated in [37] and in 3.3.1.
Basic Equivalence Axioms and Rules
The first, most basic axiom concerning operational equivalence and equivaluedness is that the booleans and Y H are not equivalent.
Non-Triviality (T).
The second set of rules concerning equivaluedness hold true also of operational equivalence. They are equivalence relations, (E.i, E.ii, E.iii). They satisfy a certain restricted form of substitutivity, (E.iv). And are preseved under simple forms of evaluation, (E.v, E.vi, E.vii), these last three principles are (equivalent to) the let-rules of the lambda-c calculus [39] .
Equivalence and Evaluation rules (E).
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The remaining axioms rules concerning operational equivalence (other than that it is an equivalence relation) are: ( 
Contextual Axioms and Rules
Contextual assertions are a modality and as such possess a rule akin to necessitation, (C.i). Note that this is a rule of proof and not an implication. A simple counterexample to the implication can be found in 3.3. The remaining axioms concerning contextual assertions are: (C.ii), contextual assertions distribute across the equivalences, again a counterexample to the converse can be found in 3.3; (C.iii), a form of contextual assertion introduction involving equivaluedness (the corresponding principle for operational equivalence is false, 3.3.1); (C.iv), a principle akin to conversion; and (C.v), a principle allowing for the manipulation of contexts.
Contextual rules (C).
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Logical Axioms and Rules
The propositional rules are, in addition to the usual Hilbert style presentation of modus ponens, (P.iii), and a generating set of tautologies, (P.i) a modal axiom corresponding to K and its converse, (P.ii).
Propositional rules (P).
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provided is an instance of a tautology
Similarly the quantifier axioms are all standard [10] 
Note that the converses of these last two axioms are easily derivable.
Undefinedness Principles
The most basic principle concerning undefinedness is that two undefined terms are both equivalued and operationally indistinguishable, (U.i). The rest of the principles concern the partiality of the underlying operation. Note that in the case of the memory operations ¦ § and © , being defined is not the same as being equivalent to a value. In the other cases this is true, although we need only express the weaker form. The stronger forms are derivable. 
Undefinedness rules (U).
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Data Operation Axioms and Rules
We treat each operation in turn. We should point out, however, that we have grouped together a collection of principles that concern when an assertion propagates into or out of a context. They may be found after this collection, (S The recognisers are similarly simple. They are either true or false, (¤ .i), and hence always equivalent to values. They are the characteristic functions of disjoint, and exhaustive sets, (¤ .ii). And they correspond to the appropriate sets in question, (¤ .iii). 
Constraint Propagation Principles
An important class of axioms are those which allow assertions to propagated into and out of assertions.
Static
, then the principles have simple counterexamples.
Notes and Observations
1. The only axioms and rules concerning are those in (S), (U), (¦ § ) and (© ). 2. Some axioms above are new in the sense that they have replaced principles that appeared in the earlier treatments [34, 23, 37, 24] . These were pointed out to me by Jacob Frost [20] .
Proof (C.r.i):
(1)
by (1, C.iii) and (P) (1)
by (E.vi).
from (1) using (E.vii, E.ii).
(3)
from (2) 
is now derivable, again pointed out to me by Jacob Frost [20] .
Proof (Q.p):
from (2) is a modality akin to we do not have a deduction theorem. However one can easily establish a weak form of the deduction theorem which is useful. 
Theorem (Weak Deduction):
Proof (Weak Deduction): This is a very simple induction on the length of proof.
A simple corollary of this is a version of reduction ad absurdum:
(Reductio Ad Absurdum)
is derivable if the derivation 
Simple Counterexamples
The following variations on the (S) principles are not valid.
Completeness
We say that an expression is first order, t I x ¦ ¥ , iff it contains neither unapplied ¡ -expressions, nor non-¡ applications. A formula is first order, t ¡ § ¥ , iff it is built up from first order expressions. The appropriate first order syntactic subclasses are defined formally by the following mutually recursive definitions: . A complex constraint is said to be static if it is a boolean combination of elements from
. Note that by (S), static constraints propagate through any contextual assertion. It would perhaps be more symetric if we defined simple constraints to be conjunctions of constraints. The reason we define them to be sets constraints is to facilitate a single definition, in particular below. Modulo this one definition, the reader may reasonably assume that is a finite conjunction of elements from . Thus any simple constraint set is equivalent to a single complex constraint. Note that a constraint set is a finite collection of formulas of the form i ¦ fresh. We sometimes abuse notation and identify with the conjuction of its members, hence treating a simple constraint set as a special type of complex constraint. 
Definition
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The First Completeness Theorem
We begin by proving a quantifier free version of the main theorem. The full version is then a simple generalization.
Theorem (Completeness -I):
If t ¡ ¥ is first order and is quantifier free, then there is a complex constraint such that e X Note that by using propositional calculus together with (P.ii) (i.e. the principle
it suffices to demonstrate the theorem when is of the form
For this reason we define
The proof of the completeness theorem involves the symbolic evaluation of arbitrary formulas and expressions, with respect to a suitable set of constraints, to a canonical form. The symbolic evaluation of an expression, with respect to a set of constraints , requires keeping track of three things: the newly allocated memory; the modifications to the original memory (described by ); and the remaining computation. The remainder of a computation is simply an expression. The newly allocated memory is simply a memory context. The modifications to the original memory are represented by another special kind of context called a modification, . We begin by defining relative to a fixed constraint set a symbolic reduction relation B ¢ ¡ . It is defined in such a way that:
and Expressions:
The definition requires the notion of a modification and the corresponding decomposition of contexts and expressions. The effects that the evaluation of an expression has on the original memory, described by constraints, are represented by contexts called modifications. They are simply sequences of assignments to variables that are not in the domain of the memory context, but are assumed to be cells. 
Definition (Modifications):
. Then the reduction relation B ¡ on formulas is the reflexive transitive closure of B ¡ given by: 
) % 
by (S) and propositional logic (P)
by (S), (mk.i) and propositional logic (P)
by (S), (set.ii), (set.i) and propositional logic (P) s uch that there is an (1)
by (CMI).
(2) ¢ 6 ¤ 9 I § by assumption.
by the above two facts and (P.cut).
(4)
by definition.
by repeated application of (C.r)
by definition. is said to reduce to a -stuck state if
is a -stuck state. In order to formalize the notion of a constraint set containing enough information, we make the following definitions. A accessor chain of length is a reduction context of the form
Note that an accessor chain of length w is just . Finally we define the notion of -completeness for constraint sets relative to a finite set of variables and atoms,
. The idea is that such a constraint set contains sufficient information to completely determine the evaluation of any expression of size less than built from the given variables and atoms. is the set of atoms occurring in .
The Main Lemmas
The following five lemmas enable a straightforward proof of the completeness theorem. Lemmas 0., 1., 3., and 4. hold for the full language, while Lemma 2. holds only for those expressions which are first order.
, then
Lemma ( . Now by lemma (2.(ii)) either
reduces to a -stuck state, or else there exists a memory context ¢ , a modification and a substitution such that . We consider these two cases in turn:
reduces to a -stuck state: 
Thus any tautological complex constraint will suffice. 
Consequently by lemma (4) we obtain the desired . Note that by (S), and coherence we have
Proof ( , then
and observe that the proof naturally divides into cases corresponding to the definitions of B £ ¡ . We begin by proving (1.(i)).
Proof (1.(i)):
. In this case:
by axioms (P).
by lemmas (CMI), and (P.cut).
by axioms (P), and (C.ii). by lemmas (CMI) and (P.cut).
(¤ )
Note that in every case other than (mk) and (set) we actually prove the stronger result that
) % This is useful in the proof of the second part of the lemma.
Proof (1.(ii)):
Assume that E © Y 6 ¤ 7 ¡ ¢ ¢ 9
. Then we have two cases: 
by axiom (C.iv).
by lemmas (CMI) and (P.cut).
by lemma (CMI).
(red) Here we consider three separate subcases depending on the nature of the reduction
. If this does not involve (mk) or (set), then by the stronger version of lemma (1.(i)) we have that
Thus by axioms (C.iii), (P), and lemma (P.cut) we obtain the desired conclusion:
Thus we are only left with the cases when the reductions involves (mk) or (set). . Actually ¡ 1
(mk)
as defined is a relation modulo -equivaluedness, but this suffices for our purposes.
Proof (Completeness -II):
We prove this by induction on the quantifier rank of our first order . The only new case we need to consider in this more general situation is how to simplify a formula of the form ¤ # # 6 4 )) ) by repeated application of (Q.iv) and its converse ( ¢ # # 6 4 3 Q 9 # # 6 ¨ 9 ) )) )
